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The concept of heroism in modern literature has caused no small stir of 
controversy among contemporary scholars.' Martin Turnell is convinced of 
a decline in heroism in modern times;%aymond Giraud finds the modern 
hero incapable of true greatness;' Wallace Fowlie considers Proust's hero, 
Swann, the prototype of the modern hero of inaction;' Sean O'Faolain 
laments the disappearance of what he names the conceptual hero;" Victor 
Brombert views the modern hero as suffering from an intellectual paralysis 
brought on by the self-questioning lucidity that is the source both of man's 
pride and of his nlisery;" finally, according to Joseph Campbell, the hero is 
not a mere Janus, but a thousand-faced con~posite who is the sum total of 
In answer to these critics-most of whom are obviously convinced that the 
modern hero is diminishing, vanishing, or somehow totally lacking in great- 
ness-I submit that there is heroism in the concept ofeizgagelnerzt as it appears 
in modern literature and literary criticism. Of course ['engagement is, admit- 
tedly, totally distinct from the concept of heroism which has prevailed in the 
Western tradition in general and in the literature inspired by Greece and 
Rome in particular. The tragic hero, as everyone knows, defied the inexorable 
whims of Fate and the provocative edicts ofthe gods-and this had a cathartic 
effect upon those who looked to the paragon for inspiration and example. 
The modern hero, however, is con~n~it ted to a more subjective style of great- 
ness. Not a slayer of monsters, nor a great conqueror, the hero we currently 
characterize as engag6 represents an individual heroic attitude which, more 
often than not, we can neither wholly understand nor approve. As Eric Bent- 
ley has observed, "the word lzet-oisnz does not mean just any sort of human 
goodness. It has reference to a philosophy of life."" CharIes I. Glicksberg 
expressed much the same thinking when he stated that the crucial problem 
of the hero in much of contemporary fiction and drama expresses the fact 
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that modern man "cannot live in the void; he must formulate some philoso- 
phy of courage, even if it is only the courage of despair, if he is to go on 
living."" This paper is an attempt to examine-on the basis of a dialectical 
investigation into the movements of specific heroes-three essential philo- 
sophical concepts of subjective, heroic commitment: Kierkegaard's religious 
thesis, Sarte's esthetic antithesis, and Camus's ethical synthesis. 
I t  is in discussing the Biblical story of Abraham-in Fern ar~d Trernblingl"- 
that Saren Kierkegaard speaks of his concept of heroic commitment. Focus- 
ing our attention on the horrifying predicament in which Abraham found 
himself because of his faith, the Danish philosopher scrutinizes the actions 
and adumbrates the qualities which constitute Abraham's greatness. 
Abraham, Kierkegaard reminds us, had received in his youth God's prom- 
ise that through his progeny all the nations of the earth would be blessed. 
God had led him away from the land of his fathers into a new, strange country 
where he had grown old in faithful expectation of the fulfillment of that 
promise. After seventy years of faithful anticipation, he still held to the 
belief-the preposterous belief-that he would have a son through whom 
God's promise would be accomplished. So what comfort it nlust have been 
to the old man to witness the birth of Isaac, what joy he must have known 
watching him grow and develop! Yet how overpowering must have been the 
dread, the distress, and the anguish concentrated into that one awful moment 
when Abraham heard the celestial voice commanding him to slaughter his 
own son and to burn his flesh on an altar: "Take Isaac, thine only son, whom 
thou lovest, and get thee to the land of Moriah, and offer him there for a 
burnt offering upon the mountain which I will show thee" (FIT27).IL 
Abraham's greatness, according to Kierkegaard, lies in the fact that he 
alone was able to assume the responsibility for responding to a comnland 
which clearly contains a divine paradox: He couId not speak to any other 
human being about his situation. The relief of speech, Kierkegaard observes, 
is that it makes one part of the universal, leads one to the comfortable position 
of being understood by others ( F I T  122-123). But who could understand 
Abraham? His situation, by its very nature, defied the understanding, since 
it exacted of him an oath of silence and because faith cannot be explained. 
The sacrifice of Isaac was manifestly an affair between Abraham and God 
wherein Abraham believed the voice he had heard to be that of God and 
felt that his duty toward God did not pernlit of mediation, but rather placed 
him in an absolute relation to the Absolute ( F / T  80). In short, Abraham was 
unable to make himself intelligible to anyone because of his God-relation- 
ship. "In these regions," says Kierkegaard, "partnership is unthinkable7' ( F I T  
82). Abraham was unable to speak, for he spoke "no human language" ( F / T  
123). 
It is precisely by virtue of his silence that Abraham differs from the tragic 
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hero. Kierkegaard compares Abraham's individualistic commitment, based 
on faith, to the movements of Agamemnon. Agamemnon, it will be remexn- 
bered. was colnpelled to sacrifice his daughter for very different reasons from 
those which induced Abraham to set out to sacrifice his son. The seer Calchas 
had announced that Agamemnon had offended the goddess Artemis, and 
that she had consequently sent adverse winds to hinder the Achaean invasion 
of Troy. Thus Agamemnon sacrificed Iphigenia as an act of expiation, to 
appease Artemis and thereby to assure the successful sailing of the Greek 
fleet to Troy, an act by which he was able to further the public good. Kierke- 
gaard also compares Abraham's situation with that of Jephthah, the leader 
of the Jews, who immolated his daughter to assure the Israelite victory over 
the Ammonites. He finds that it resembles vaguely that of Brutus, who con- 
demned his sons to a sacrificial death for their part in a conspiracy. But 
whereas Agamemnon, Jephthah, and Brutus clearly had moral grounds for 
sacrificing their own children, Abraham had none. None of the positions he 
occupied (father, head of a household, husband, etc.) involved duties which 
called for his killing Isaac." Jean Wahl has rightly summarized Kierkegaard's 
discussion by stating that the tragic hero is "un personnage public" (a public 
individual) while Abraham represents "la vraie intCrioritCW (true inward- 
ness).',' The fundamental difference between the tragic hero and Abraham 
consists of the fact that the tragic hero remains within the realm of what 
society considers ethical, while Abraham does not. Cllestov was thus justified 
when he observed that Abraham, ethically speaking, was an outlaw." The 
tragic hero is therefore understood by all, while Abraham cannot explain his 
situation to anyone. Alienated, without connections or pretensions, divorced, 
as it were, from the world about him and bearing the dreadful burden of 
individual commitment, Abraham walks according to faith and in total 
silence, knowing that he cannot justify himself to any other human being. 
Not only does Kierkegaard show that Abraham was unable to justify his 
behavior to other human beings, he also shows that he could not justify the 
sacrificing of Isaac, either rationally or ethically, even to himself. The ethical 
designation for what Abraham did is infanticide. According to God's own 
law, killing a human being was regarded a s  murder.  This is the absurd 
predicament in which Abraham found himself because of his faith, and which 
Kierkegaard refers to as the "teleological suspension of the ethical." The 
predicament may be described by saying that Abraham's faith in G o d  
required of him that he suspend his own feelings and understanding as well 
as the ethicaI mode of existence to which he was accustonled. By virtue of 
his act of faith which overstepped the ethical, Abral~am came to possess a 
higher rcXos outside of it, in relation to which the ethical could be suspended 
( F / T 6 9 ) .  Kierkegaard points out that the very nature of Abraham's heroism 
is that it depended upon the contradiction between his feelings and the act 
which he l ~ a d  to perform." As Croxall puts it, only by faith was Abraham 
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"able to hold on to a position wliich to the intellect is absurd and to ethics 
abhorrent." '" 
Kierkegaard's concept of heroic commitment-that of Abraham, the 
''Knight of Faithm-is, for him, the highest development of man. The tragic 
hero, according to Kierkegaard, never achieves the greatness of the "Knight 
of Faith," but rather can be categorized into a lesser stage of development 
which he calls "infinite resignation." This means that the tragic hero accepts 
comlnitment to a given cause only when it can be translated into universal 
or ethical terms, whereas the "Knight of Faith" is the individual who lives 
within the realm of constant trial, of perpetual choice; that is, in the realm 
of terrible freedom ( F / T  85-88). Abraham, as Kierkegaard's only example 
of the "Knight of Faith," makes two movements: First, he makes the move- 
ment of "infinite resignation" and gives up Isaac. He will resign himself to 
the infinite wisdom of God as shown by his willingness to murder his son; 
but in the next instant lie makes the movement of faith when he says to 
himself: "But yet this will not come to pass, or if it does come to pass, then 
the Lord will give me a new Isaac, by virtue . . . of the absurd" ( F / T  124). 
What the "Knight of Faith" exhibits, according to Kierkegaard, is "a new 
creation by virtue of the absurd" ( F / T  5 l), by resigning everything infinitely 
and then grasping everything again by virtue of the absurd. It is this illogical 
expectation on the part of Abraham which Kierkegaard calls the "movement 
of the absurd" (FIT  1 lo), or the leap of faith. 
Since any truth, in Kierkegaard's view, is objectively uncertain, there is 
great risk involved in personal commitment.'' Thus while other heroes resign 
themselves to the comfort and security of objective certainties-Ethics and 
Reason-Kierkegaard's liero of l'engngement demonstrates the notion that 
truth cannot be known objectively, it can only be lived." 
Abraham is not a hero we can emulate, an example for us to follow. Kier- 
kegaard indicates precisely that we can only approach him with a horror 
religiosus ( F / T  7 1). We must not see him as a religious paradigm or t ~ y e  of
liero according to which all "leaps of faith" are to be declined.'"ndeed, 
Kierkegaard maintains in his Postscriyt that "the religious paradigm is an 
irregularity.""' Thus Abraham is, if anything, an anti-hero: He was, in Kier- 
kegaard's niind, "great by reason of his power whose wisdom is impotence, 
great by reason of his wisdom whose secret is foolishness, great by reason 
ofliis hope whose form is madness, great by virtue of his love wliich is hatred 
of oneself' ( F / T  3 I)." His greatness lies in his being the unethical, irrational, 
subjective, silent, inimitable individual. 
In L 'Existentialisme est tiit Htlma/?istne," Jean-Paul Sartre summarily 
defines his concept of commitment as "l'engagement libre," a definition 
which is itself a contradiction of terms. It is by virtue of this so-called "free 
commitment," however, that the Sartrean hero assumes liis identity and 
becomes, even if only ten~porarily, a type of humanity. For Sartre, there is 
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absolutely no difference between p e e  being, planned or projected being (as 
existence choosing its essence), or absolute being. "What people want," he 
maintains, "is to be born heroes or cowards."" But according to Sartre, a 
man must becotlze a coward or hero and can do so only through personal 
commitment which-like the individualistic "leap of faith" of Kierkegaard's 
Abraham-must remain a very subjective existential venture. 
Although it nlay be argued that the more salient examples of the Sartrean 
htros engagt are Orestes, hero of Les Moucl?es (1943), or Mathieu of Sartre's 
trilogy Les Che t~~ ins  cle la Liberf;, one can find, I believe, all the basic charac- 
teristics of the Sartrean hero in Antoine Roquentin-protagonist of Sartre's 
first published novel, Lo Nauste."' 
Lu NazlsPe is the first-person account of Sartre's hero, ofwhom the fictional 
"editors" tell us only this: "Antoine Roquentin, after travelling througl~ Cen- 
tral Europe, North Africa and the Far East, settledin Bouville for three years 
to conclude his historical research oil the Marquis de Rollebon (Editors' 
Note)." We are informed later that Sartre's would-be biographer is thirty 
years old, and that he lives alone on a modest. but sufficient, income which 
allows him to pursue his research (Nrruste 241-242). Roquentin's journals 
tell us of his awakening to the contingency of being, to the absurdity of his 
existence. Sartre's own Gautui~zr~, Roquentin is illuminated as he sits at the 
foot of an enormous tree. There, he is prompted to develop a rather ingenious 
concept of I'engngemen I. 
Roquentin's vision comes about in the course of his observing the man- 
defined universe about him. He discovers, for example, that the nomencla- 
ture, diversity, and classifications imposed upon things by man are but an 
appearance, a coat of varnisl~, which, when peeled off, bares the underlying 
chaos of existence. The now-famous chestnut-tree vision reveals to him the 
chaotic proliferation of an un-named world hidden by the veil of habit and 
abstract categories. The world-his world-henceforth needs re-definition, for 
the habitual relationship of man and the world has been shattered. Objects 
refuse to be fitted into established hurnan definitions. They tend to overflow 
man-made categories. As Roquentin comes to this realization, he experiences 
nausea. 
Sartre's hero eventually comes to the realization that his attacks of nausea 
do not represent a sickness, but rather a heightened, dreadful awareness-a 
n~etaphysical trouble or entzui (Nmwte 15 1). Roquentin struggles to free him- 
self from the web of fantasy in which others are caught, in an attempt to 
escape his nausea. Besides rejecting the traditional definitions of things, he 
becon~es aware of the impact of inter-subjectivity upon his own life-style. 
Here Sartre marks clearly the utter ridiculousness of con~plying with a phan- 
tasmagorial order and attempts to enumerate the practices his hero must 
avoid in order to avoid bad faith and attain authenticity. Roquentin decries, 
for instance, man's dependence upon the image others have of him. I11 the 
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poetic crossfire of gazes, man's world may well beco~ne a world of labels, 
and life a stage where each man assumes his separate role in a collective 
comedy of errors. In each hurnnn case, once thc label has bee11 appliccl and 
assumed, the Word becomes flesh and dwells among us and, l ~ k e  the B~blical, 
anthropomorphized Word, saves us from our sins, that is, from our selves. 
Roquentin's introspection finally leads him to believe that he has an identity 
quite distinct from that imposed upoil him by others: his body and thought 
are not separate, not a duality, but rather one entity. He is a viscous, contin- 
gent, thinking thing. 
As the shattering reality of the groulldlesslless for human existence 
becolnes more and inore apparent to him, Roquentin becomes aware of 
himself as consciousness-in-the-world by bearing witness to the contingency 
of the world through language. Thus Roquentin has been likened to 
Nietzsche's Dionysiac Inan who, having torn asunder the veil of Maya and 
looked into the true nature of things, is both enlightened and paralyzed by 
what he seesLi Hence Roquentin's struggle to understand himself and to 
achieve authenticity in a world void of meaning leads him to strive to redefine 
the world for l7imself: This existential image of man as consciousness in and 
of the world corresponds to the Sartrean definition of commitment alluded 
to earlier: I'engagernet~t libre. "I an1 free," Roquentin tells us. "I have no 
reason for living" (Nrrtake 219). Yet Sartre's author-hero reasons that he 
might justify his own existence somehow by writins a novel ofwhich his own ? life is the substance. Of course he does not e~ lv i s i o~ l  a traditional use of 
language as labels, clicl~es, and so forth, for these l~ave  duped llinl in the 
past. He wishes to use words, not as objects, but as signs. In freeing himself 
from illusion, Roquentin learns to use language as a tool for his own conscious 
appraisal of, and collln~itn~ellt  to, the world. Aided by a deep sense of 
language as communication rather than ritual, he hopes to become like an 
untoucl~able refrain of music, an authentic, pitiless witness to his own meta- 
morphosis from conlplacency to awareness (Nausie  59, 18 l ,  188,244). 
It would have to be a book- I don't know l~ow to do  anything clse. But not a hlstory 
book: h ~ s t o ~ y  talks about what has exlsted-an existent can never justify thc existence 
of another existent. I erred in wanting to rcsurrcct the Marqu~s  de Rollebon. Another 
type of book. I don't quite know which k~nd-but you would have to percelvc, behincl 
the printed words. behind the pages. something which would not cxist, which would 
bc rrbovc. ex~stcnce. . . It would have to be beaut~ful and hard as steel and make 
people ashamed of the~r  exlstcnce. (Nalr~2e 248-249) 
The hero of LN Nrr~uke is committed, then, in that he fancles himself to 
be an esthetician with a mission: through language he will become a witness 
to the inauthenticity of others and thereby make them ashamed of their 
existence. Thus while the heroes of Les Clzetnir?s de lrr Lzberti may seem more 
engagis-at least politically-it seems to me that Sartre has never been able 
to abandon totally the moralistic esthetics of Roquentin. 
HEROIC COMMITMENT 23 
Of course one would be as hard-pressed to define Sartrean morality as 
Sartre is h im~e l f .~Vr i t i ng  and observing, however, have forever been his 
fundamental manifestation of commitment. Thus Canlus was perhaps quite 
accurate when, in reviewing La Nauske in L'Algela t'kpzhlicain on October 
20, 1938, he reduced Sartre's thinking to the following cogito: "J'Ccris, donc 
je suis" ("I write, therefore I am"). However justified or unjustified one may 
find Camus's early appraisal of Sartrean heroism, time bears witness to the 
fact that Sartre has clearly taken the "leap of esthetics," seemingly refusing 
every other binding commitment which has threatened to thwart the freedom 
of the esthetician. Editor of Les T e ~ z p s  Modernes since 1946 and more recently 
Director of a Maoist newspaper published in Paris, Sartre has consistently 
exercised, and will likely continue to exercise, the commitment to art first 
foreshadowed by the hero of La Natlske. 
Both Kierkegaard and Sartre had a formative effect on Camus as he de- 
veloped his own concepts of the absurdity of the human condition and the 
ways of living it permitted. On one hand Camus opposed (yet still became 
imbued with) the thinking of Kierkegaard, whom he quite justifiably con- 
sidered to be the father of modern existentialism and the most formidable 
advocate of Christian Existentialism. On the other hand, it was Camus's own 
contemporary, con~patriot and fellow-artist, Jean-Paul Sartre-leading expo- 
nent of coeval existentialism and, in particular, of Atheistic Existentialism- 
with whom he found himself, and his ideas on heroism, in conflict. Camus's 
concept of comnlitment occupies a position which can be described, with 
regard to the antipodes of Christian and Atheistic Existentialism, as equato- 
rial. 
Unlike Kierkegaard's Abraham and Sartre's Roquentin, Camus's fictional 
embodiment of I'engagenzent is concerned with the very difficult task of 
accepting absurdity as a fundamental imbalance inherent in the human con- 
dition. Camus is convinced that there is an abyss between the knowledge he 
acquires concerning his existence and the practical application of that knowl- 
edge which can never be spanned." Because he sees an image of this absurd 
imbalance in the predicament of the legendary Sisyphus, Camus reconstructs 
the myth of Sisyphus and derives therefrom his concept of heroism. 
For Carnus, Sisyphus displays the philosophical attitude of the individual 
integrated into the world we know now and here. In this world ofthe present, 
Camus's hero finds a measure of plenitude. Although condemned to Hades. 
a prisoner of the gods and destined to the futile task of forever pushing the 
same boulder up the same mountain trail, Sisyphus (we are told) is happy 
(Mythe 198). Sisyphus represents, for Camus, a superior form of commitment: 
He denies the gods, yet follows their absurd decrees. Clearly this is an image 
of the human condition. The formula of this hero-a shibboleth which mani- 
fests an attitude of plenitude or "this-worldliness"-is "Tout est bien," or "All 
is well" (Mytlze 198). Thus for Camus, commitment means daily re-integra- 
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tion into the absurdity of daily existence, absurdity itself being an integral, 
inescapable part of the human predicament. Sisyphus is great because he, 
having recognized this, is at once without hope arzd happy. 
Camus believed that the hero of Sgren Kierkegaard-Abraham, the 
"Knight of Faith"-expresses an attitude of faith, not in the world we know, 
but in the unknown realm of God. For Cartlus, such faith denotes a dangerous 
antipathy to satisfaction and finality, a belief that anything genuinely real 
or truly good cannot be achieved within the sphere of man's natural life or 
within the repertory of ordinary human experience. According to Camus, 
Abraham had faith, not in the world, but rather in the God who promised 
to rectify the world. Moreover, in consenting to murder his own son for 
"other-worldly" values, Abraham was compelled to abdicate human values 
(ethics, reason). Camus is collvinced that a11 the effort of Kierkegaard's intel- 
ligence is directed "towards escaping the antinomy of the human condition" 
(Mythe 126). Abraham's "leap of faith," according to Camus, is suicidal, both 
in terms of philosophy and of commit~nent or heroisnl (Mytlze 128). 
No less evasive, according to Camus, is the position of Sartre's hero of Lrr 
Nauske. Camus's criticism of Roquentin deals wit11 two points which are 
fundamental in the novel, namely: (1) As a result of Roquentin's vision of 
the contingency of being he arrives at the conclusion that he is totally free 
(Nrrwke 219). Recognizing his new-found freedom, Sartre's hero launches an 
attack on the ideas of the inhabitants of Bouville. Unlike Roquentin, the 
BouviHians rely on the fixed and inlnlutable laws of nature to regulate their 
lives, laws from which Roquentin's illumination exempts him. (2) Yet after 
having condemned others for slipping into convention and I~abit in order to 
mask their existence, Roqentin adopts for himself a position of hope which 
Camus likens to faith: by writing a novel, in which he would relate his own 
experience of life's absurdity, Roquentin hopes to be delivered from nausea 
and to justify his own existence. For Camus, consciousness of the absurdity 
of one's predicament does not warrant either faith or the beIief in absoIute 
freedom, nor does ~t imply the saving power of writing fiction. 
In an interview which took place in 1945, Camus rather simply categorized 
existentiaIists into two camps-Christian Existentialists, such as Kierkegaard 
and Jaspers, and Atheistic or Nihilistic Existentialists such as Husserl, Hei- 
degger, and Sartre-and stated his own position with regard to these two 
camps: "I believe that there must be a tolerable truth between the two."" 
While he readily admits that sonle of his ideas may be found in existential 
analyses, Canlus claims that the existentialists "deify that which crushes them 
and search-even in that which degrades them-for something in which to 
place their hope" ( M y t h  122). He considers such totemism, whether it take 
the form of religious or of esthetic commitment, an escape from the fun- 
damental absurdity of the human condition. 
It should now be clear to the reader that the philosopllical concepts of 
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Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Camus regarding heroic commitment are inter- 
related. Faced with the dreadful chasm of absurdity, the three heroes dis- 
cussed here react in conflicting ways: Abraham reacts through the "leap of 
faith"; Roquentin reacts through the evasive "leap of freedom and esthet- 
ics"; and between them, Sisyphus re-integrates himself into the very absur- 
dity from which both Abraham and Roquentin seek to escape. For as the 
boulder of Sisyphus rolls down the infernal slopes, Camus's hero pauses and, 
rising to his full stature, returns erect to his awful burden beIow. 
In the context of twentieth-century thought, where the annihilation of the 
human family by man-made devices is no longer an academic fantasy, 
Carnus's concept of con~mitnlent may we11 hold the key to the survival and 
destiny of man. Kierkegaard admitted that Abra l~an~  was the only exarnple 
ofthe "Knight of Faith" he had ever encountered in history; Sartre's Clzemirzs 
de In Libertb (Pathways to Fideedoionz) lead to an impasse; but the greatness 
described by Camus, accessible to every man, is, at base, the realization that 
man is a relative creature, that his freedom is limited and his logic finite. 
It is my feeling that Carnus aimed at forlnulating a positive response to life- 
that of the hiros ubstirrle-as a reaction to the tenets of Christian and Atheistic 
Existentialism Ire discerned In his own time. His absurd hero, Sisyphus, 
recognizes the limitations ofhis absurd situation and, within those li~nitations, 
attempts to find happiness. Such a modest approach to committnent suggests 
that we sho~hd live for a cause, not die for it; that we look, but not Ieap."" 
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